ABSTRACT
I. Introduction: The Key Legal Issues
Constitutions, statutes, and regulations create public offices, and frequently such legal instruments also create qualifications for those offices. When positive law creates qualifications for elected positions, these restrictions limit the scope of democratic choice.
1 nevertheless, such restrictions on democratic choice have a long pedigree 2 in a variety of jurisdictions. 3 Adjudications relating to qualifications to public office are not uncommon. 4 Likewise, in the United States, the Constitution sets out qualifications for elected federal officials: i.e., Representatives, Senators, President and Vice President. Such qualifications include, among others, provisions relating to age, citizenship, and residence. 170 (2007) . Throughout this Article, I treat all constitutional restrictions on a candidate's being elected or holding office as "qualifications." It may be that some of these constitutional provisions are better characterized as "eligibility requirements," as opposed to a true "qualification." A candidate who lacks a qualification for an office is capable of being elected, and the candidate may assume office if she becomes qualified after the election but prior to the start of the term for which she was elected (or, even, if she becomes qualified within a reasonable time after the start of the term). On the other hand, where a candidate lacks an eligibility requirement, the candidate is incapable of being elected, and all votes cast for such a candidate are void. In such a situation, even if the candidate subsequently meets the eligibility requirement prior to the start of the term for which she was "elected," the candidate cannot assume office. See, e.g., State v. Howell, 126 P. 954, 955-56 (Wash. 1912 ) (Gose, J.) (holding that constitutional restrictions relating to "eligibility" relate to the capability of the candidate to be chosen at the time of election); luther stearns Cushing, elements of the law anD PraCtiCe of legislative assemBlies in the uniteD states of ameriCa § 175, at 66 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 2d ed. 1866) ("If an election is made of a person, who is ineligible, that is incapable of being elected, the election of such person is absolutely void . . . .").
qualifications in the Constitution's text are exclusive (i.e., floors and ceilings) or whether they are merely floors, which can be supplemented by additional qualifications imposed by Congress and/or by the States. once again, this issue has become topical. Hillary Clinton, a former Secretary of State and former Senator, is a prominent candidate in the upcoming Democratic Party primary elections. These primaries select delegates to a national convention which will choose the Democratic Party's candidate for the november 2016 popular presidential election. It has been alleged that, during her term of service as Secretary of State, Clinton violated a provision of the federal statute mandating government record keeping. 6 Section 2071 of Disqualify, 32 QuinniPiaC l. rev. 209, 287-94 (2014) (Senate-imposed disqualification is a bar against holding the presidency, but not in regard to holding a congressional seat), and Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 minn. l. rev. 347, 351 & n.23, 420-21 (2010) (same), with Seth Barrett Tillman, Originalism & The Scope of the Constitution's Disqualification Clause, 33 QuinniPiaC l. rev. 59 passim (2014) (Senate-imposed disqualification extends only to statutory or appointed offices, but not to any constitutionally-mandated or elected positions). Professors Chafetz and Muller have suggested that the Ineligibility Clause is a qualification or a disqualification in regard to holding a congressional seat. Compare Chafetz, supra note 1, at 168 (quoting the Ineligibility Clause, i.e., Article I, Section 6, Clause 2, in a discussion on disqualifications), with Derek T. Muller, Scrutinizing Federal Electoral Qualifications, 90 inD. L.J. 559, 564, 567 (2015) (discussing the Ineligibility Clause as a qualification). The clauses of the Constitution controlling elections have also been described as qualifications. See, e.g., Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 26 n.23 (1972) (Stewart, J.) ("One of those qualifications is that a Senator be elected by the people of his State." (emphasis added)). These other constitutional provisions, whether properly characterized as "qualifications" or not, do not directly concern our analysis of Section 2071 or other purported statutory disqualifications. Finally, must the President be a living human being? See Muller, supra at 563, 567-72 (expounding on qualifications for the presidency and vice presidency, including whether and, by implication, when a purported President must be alive for the purposes of Article II, Section 1, Clause 5); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Bill Clinton Unconstitutional? The Case for President Strom Thurmond, 13 Const. Comment. 217, 222 (1996) ("Surely the Chief Justice should refuse to swear in President Gus the Dog, even if the lawfully constituted electoral college chose him."). ' 'under,' and ' under the Authority of' are essentially synonymous." (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)). If the Amars' intuition on this textual issue is correct, if "office under the United States" and "officers of the United States" are "synonymous," then, per Mouat and its progeny, the presidency is neither an officer of nor under the United States. But see aKhil reeD amar, the law of the lanD: a granD tour of our Constitutional rePuBliC 332 n.8 (2015) (discussing the Incompatibility Clause, and noting that "[t]he presidency is an 'office under the United States.'" (emphasis added)); but see also aKhil reeD amar, ameriCa's Constitution: a BiograPhy 171 (2005) ("The instant such a [legislative leader] became acting president, he would thereby 'hold[]' an 'Office under the United States' . . . ." (emphasis added)); but cf. Amar & Amar, supra at 136 n.143 (arguing that an acting President is an "officer of the United States"). In Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906) (Harlan, J.) , the Supreme Court adjudicated the scope of a statutory provision in which as a consequence of conviction, a party is precluded from "holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the government of the United States." Id. at 360. The Court reasoned that such a conviction did not bar a person from a Senate seat.
The seat into which [the defendant-senator] was originally inducted as a Senator from Kansas could only become vacant by his death, or by expiration of his term of office, or by some direct action on the part of the Senate in the exercise of its constitutional powers. This must be so for the further reason that the declaration in [the statutory provision], that anyone convicted under its provisions shall be incapable of holding any office of honor, trust, or profit 'under the government of the United States,' refers only to offices created by, or existing under the direct authority of, the national government, as organized under the Constitution, and not to offices the appointments to which are made by the states, acting separately, albeit proceeding, in respect of such appointments, under the sanction of that instrument. While the Senate, as a branch of the legislative department, owes its existence to the Constitution, and participates in passing laws that concern the entire country, its members are chosen by state legislatures, and cannot properly be said to hold their places 'under the government of the United States.'
Id. at 369-70. How the Burton Court's ratio decidendi would apply (if at all) to the presidency is less than pellucidly clear.
A. The LegAL PoPuLisT
The legal populist approach is the interpretive position of the person on the street. The populist's position is largely an intuition or feeling. As Baron Devlin explained:
He is not expected to reason about anything and his judgement may be largely a matter of feeling. It is the viewpoint of the man on the streetor to use an archaism familiar to all lawyers-the man in the Clapham omnibus. He might also be called the right-minded man.
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I expect our rider on the Clapham omnibus (or to make the analogy more on-point, the American rider on the bus going past the Supreme Court of the United States)-if asked to squarely address Section 2071's meaningwould say:
In everyday language, the presidency is described as an 'office,' and the president is an 'officer.' Similarly, the presidency is not a state or municipal position; rather, it is a national or federal position whose occupant is responsible to the United States, and its people, as a whole. Therefore the presidency can be characterized as "under the United States." Because the presidency is an "office" and because the President works for "the United States," it would seem to follow that the presidency is an "office under the United States" as that language is used in Section 2071. In each example above, the two national newscasters, the (former) Attorney General, and the academic from Yale Law School-no analysis, no reasoning, and no authority is put forward. This is not surprising because here the basis of the position is a simple text-based intuition. 16 To sum up, if the legal populists' intuitionist approach is correct, if the meaning of "office under the United States" extends to the presidency, then a conviction under Section 2071 imposes a statutory bar against holding the presidency. 
B. The hisToricAL APProAch
Some early American materials cast light on the meaning of "office under the United States." Indeed, we can turn to two separate incidents from President George Washington's first administration to understand the meaning of this somewhat opaque phrase.
President George Washington's Gift from the French Ambassador
The Constitution's Foreign emoluments Clause provides: [n] Letter from George Washington to Ambassador Ternant (Dec. 22, 1791) , in 9 the PaPers of george washington, id. at 306 (emphasis added) (editors' footnote omitted).
Washington accepted the ambassador's gift (the print and its frame), he kept the gift, and he never asked for congressional consent to accept or to keep the gift. This gift was not one of de minimis value, 20 nor was it a gift from a close personal friend or relative of Washington's. It was an official or diplomatic gift from a foreign ambassador to our head of state. 21 This incident suggests that President Washington was not an Officer . . . under the United States, and that he did not conceive of his position as one.
Is it possible that President Washington erred in regard to accepting the French ambassador's gift, but failing to ask for congressional consent? evidence arising in connection with the Washington administration is generally considered superior to that of later administrations.
22 Why? First, Washington's administration was contemporaneous with the Constitution's ratification. 23 Fifth and finally, Thomas Pinckney was a ratifier: he attended South Carolina's state convention which ratified the Constitution; indeed, he was president of the state convention. See Pinckney, Thomas (1750 Thomas ( -1828 , BiograPhiCal DireCtory of the uniteD states Congress, http://bioguide. congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=P000357 (last visited Feb. 11, 2016) . President Washington appointed Pinckney Minister Plenipotentiary for the United States, at London. See id. This position, although not in the cabinet, was tied as the second highest paid position in the government: only the President had a higher salary. See Hamilton, List of Civil Officers of the United States, supra note 25, at 57-68 (listing compensation of government officials, including the President, who made $25,000 per year, and Pinckney and Morris, who each made $9,000 per year, and also received $9,000 for "outfit"), http://tinyurl.com/z6h9u23; see supra note 25 (reporting the Vice President's and Chief Justice's salaries). See, e.g., stanley elKins & eriC mCKitriCK, the age of feDeralism: the early ameriCan rePuBliC, 1788-1800, at 495 (1993) ("[T]he role Washington had marked out for himself-that of a chief magistrate resolutely above all party and faction-was one which by the end of his administration he saw himself less and less able to protect. The unity which he, as the first head of a fragile republic exposed to all the broils of world conflict, had worked so painfully to construct was being threatened by irresponsible partisans in the nation's midst."); id. On the one hand, it was a great act of nonpartisan statesmanship-in refusing a third term in office, Washington established a precedent against the pernicious tendency toward presidencies-for-life. On the other hand, partisan politics provided a backdrop to Washington's grave farewell. He postponed his announcement until September 17, 1796. This put the Republicans at a serious disadvantage in the presidential election campaign, as Jefferson and his supporters were not prepared to contest Washington's decision to continue in office. Nevertheless, the Republicans almost managed to defeat John Adams, Washington's Vice-President and a man devoted to Washington's non-party ideal, who was now obliged to make his way in the ascendant world of party politics." (footnotes omitted)).
ists.
29 Fifth, Washington understood that his personal and his administration's conduct were precedent-setting in regard not only to significant deeds, but even in regard to what might appear to be minor events and conduct.
30 Indeed, the dominant view is that Washington's conduct deserves special deference in regard to both "foreign affairs" 31 and "presidential etiquette." 32 Both of these latter considerations apply to the facts, circumstances, and legal issues surrounding President Washington's accepting the French ambassador's gift. It follows then that if Washington did not err, then the President is not encompassed by the Foreign emolument Clause's "office . . . under the United States" language. It would seem to follow that if President Washington was not an "office[r] . . . under the United States" for the purposes of the Foreign emoluments Clause, then president-elect Clinton (should she be elected) would not be an "office[r] under the United States" under Section 2071.
Secretary Hamilton's List
There is a second precedent from the Washington administration. In 1792, the Senate ordered Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton to draft a financial statement listing all persons holding "office . . . under the United States" and their salaries. Hamilton took more than nine months to draft a response. Hamilton's response, in 1793, was some ninety manuscript-sized pages. In it, he included personnel in each of the three branches of the federal government. States" for the purposes of Hamilton's list, it would seem to follow that the presidency is not an "office under the United States" as that phrase is used in other legal documents and instruments, including Section 2071.
Post-Civil War Scholarship
Later commentators seem to agree. McKnight, a late nineteenth-century commentator, discussing how "office" language was used in the Constitution, stated: "It is obvious that . . . the President is not regarded as 'an officer of, or under, the United States,' but as one branch of 'the Government."' 34 Likewise, Anne Twomey, a modern commentator, discussing how "office under the Crown" is used in Australian law, stated: "As [the public position at issue] is an elective office, and not generally subject to the direction or supervision of the government, one would assume that it is not an office held 'under the Crown'." 35 The origins of Section 2071's disqualification-related "office under the United States" language go back to the modern statute's 1853 predecessor.
36
As explained, we have eighteenth-century precedents from President Washington and his administration, late nineteenth-century scholarly authority, and modern scholarly authority, domestic and foreign, indicating that this "office under the United States" language (or closely similar language) does not reach elected positions, such as the presidency. This would seem to indicate that the 1853 statute's "office under the United States" language and its modern successor, Section 2071, do not reach the presidency.
Although this historical approach has a certain attractiveness, it is hardly decisive. our goal here is not to understand how "office . . . unState Papers); see also der the United States" was used in 1791 (per Washington), in 1793 (per Hamilton), or in 1878 (per McKnight), or thereafter. nor is our goal to understand how this phrase (or closely similar statutory terminology) was understood in other contexts, domestic and foreign, unrelated to Section 2071. Rather, our goal "is to construe the language [of the statute] so as to give effect to the intent of Congress." 37 Thus, this historical argument is convincing to the extent we can be confident that Congress in 1853 was making use of standard legal jargon, whose meaning was: (i) static since Washington's and Hamilton's day; (ii) singular and undisputed; and (iii) shared widely at the time Congress enacted this provision.
c. PresumPTions of sTATuTory inTerPreTATion
Recognizing the ambiguity and difficulty in regard to determining Congress' intent in regard to Section 2071's "office under the United States" language, this approach turns to general presumptions, principles, or canons of statutory interpretation.
General "Office" Language does not Reach the Presidency
It is an accepted principle of federal statutory construction that general language in a statute, such as "agency," which does not explicitly refer to the presidency amounts to "textual silence."
38 Such "textual silence is not enough to subject the presidency to the provisions of" 39 a statute. This principle of statutory construction is primarily rooted in two policy concerns: "separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President."
40
It is not clear that these concerns are at play here. For example, if in the future former Secretary Clinton were elected to the presidency, and if prior to the start of her four-year term she were convicted under Section 2071, then, arguably, such a conviction would prevent Clinton, the president-elect, from becoming President in the first instance, and presumably, someone else (i.e., the vice president elect) would succeed to the presidency. Such a successor, as a formal legal matter, would be free to exercise all the powers and prerogatives of the presidency. However, it is possible (perhaps likely) that a successor in such circumstances would not enjoy the broad democratic mandate of a president-elect: as a practical matter, such a successor might be unable to wield the full powers of office.
on the other hand, the Department of Justice's office of Legal Counsel has argued that this principle of statutory construction applies where the statute's application impinges on the "President's constitutional Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800-01.
Id. at 800.
prerogatives."
41 one might suggest that, notwithstanding the availability of a successor, a statute which prevents a president-elect from becoming President, and therefore, which prevents such a person from exercising any presidential powers, is one which impinges on the "president's constitutional prerogatives." If this syllogism is substantially correct, it follows that Section 2071's general "office under the United States" language does not apply to the presidency.
Furthermore, this principle of statutory construction-i.e., that general language in a statute does not cover the presidency-has been understood to apply even where the stated policy concerns are not at play. 42 [S]tatutes which refer to 'officers' or 'officials' of the United States are construed not to include the President unless there is a specific indication that Congress intended to cover the Chief executive.
44
I have found no evidence of any such "specific indication" in reported congressional debate on the 1853 statute; 45 indeed, I found no congressional debate in any way addressing the statute's "office under the United States" language. Furthermore, Rehnquist opined that this principle of statutory interpretation is "particularly applicable" where the statute is "obscure." C. 124, 1996 C. 124, WL 876050, at *34 (1996 (Dellinger, A.G.) . Consider a slightly different context. If after she were to win the November 2016 popular general election, Clinton were prosecuted under Section 2071 by the outgoing administration, and afterwards sworn into office in January 2017, and subsequently convicted, then Section 2071's disqualification provision would not keep her from becoming President, but would instead (arguably) remove her from office. Although such a result might not impinge on the "presidency's constitutional prerogatives" (as long as a successor were available), such a result does impinge on the disqualified former "president's constitutional prerogatives." 5 Br. J. Am. Leg. Studies (2016) 
Interpretations of Statutory Language Restricting the Scope of Democratic Choice are not Favored
Another well-settled canon of statutory construction-the democracy canon-is that statutory and constitutional language limiting eligibility to office is interpreted narrowly. As Corpus Juris Secundum, a leading treatise, explains:
Statutes limiting the right of a person to hold office are to be given a liberal construction in favor of those seeking to hold office in order that the public may have the benefit of choice from all those who are in fact and in law qualified. Ambiguities should be resolved in favor of eligibility to office, and constitutional and statutory provisions which restrict the right to hold public office should be strictly construed against ineligibility.
47
Because Section 2071's general "office under the United States" language does not explicitly refer to the presidency but does limit candidate eligibility and, in effect, voter rights, this provision should not be interpreted as applying to the presidency. 
III. If the Statute Reaches the Presidency, is it Constitutional?
If a court decides that Section 2071 reaches the presidency, it will then turn to the provision's constitutionality. The issue here is one of power: may Congress by statute impose qualifications for the presidency beyond those already in the Constitution's text?
A. JudiciAL AuThoriTy
In 1966, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was elected to a twelfth consecutive term in the United States House of Representatives. Because of allegations of corruption, when the new Congress met in 1967, Powell was not sworn in with the other members-elect. Thereafter, a House committee produced a report which stated that Powell had, prior to the first meeting of the new Congress, wrongfully diverted House funds to himself and others. The House voted to exclude Powell and declared his seat vacant. Powell sued both to regain his seat and for lost salary. In Powell v. McCormack, 48 decided in 1969, the Supreme Court held that the House's refusal to seat Powell-his exclusion-was unconstitutional. 49 In other words, the House can only exclude a member-elect based on qualifications expressly stated in the Constitution: e.g., age, years of citizenship, and inhabitancy. 50 Allegations of corruption, even if proven, will not do. Thus, notwithstanding the Constitution's textually demonstrable commitment granting the House authority (if not exclusive authority) to judge its members' qualifications, 51 the House's excluding a member-elect for any other reason is unconstitutional. Powell's result was hardly surprising: Alexander Hamilton, prior to ratification of the Constitu- Powell was only awarded a declaratory judgment because the congressional term for which he had been wrongfully excluded had already ended by the time the Supreme Court reached its decision. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 550. The declaratory judgment permitted Powell to seek backpay from the lower courts on remand, but only against non-elected House officers, i.e., the Clerk, Sergeant-at-Arms, and Doorkeeper, and not against the Speaker or any members. Judicial review of single-house action in regard to qualifications and related contexts can rarely be timely, and as Powell illustrates, even if available, it is not meaningful. See the feDeralist no. 53, supra note 5, at 293-94 (James Madison-but authorship is disputed) ("[I]n single states where they are large and hold but one legislative session in the year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated [by a legislative chamber] and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. . . . Were elections for the federal legislature to be annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, particularly in the more distant states.").
50
See supra note 5 (collecting constitutional provisions). 51 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 ("Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members . . . .").
tion, took this position in The Federalist, 52 as did other prominent early postratification commentators, such as Justice Joseph Story.
53
Powell and its progeny 54 have come to stand for the proposition that the Constitution's express textual qualifications in Article I for membership in the House and Senate are exclusive. Moreover, the rationale of Powelli.e., the primacy of the Constitution's express provisions setting fixed textual qualifications-would equally apply to the eligibility provisions for the presidency in Article II. 55 Indeed, this extension of Powell appears uncontroversial. For example, in dicta, Chief Judge Posner explained:
The democratic presumption is that any adult member of the polity . . . is eligible to run for office. . . . The requirement in the U.S. Constitution that the President be at least 35 years old and Senators at least 30 is unusual and reflects the felt importance of mature judgment to the effective discharge of the duties of these important offices; nor, as the cases we have just cited hold, may Congress or the states supplement these requirements.
56
Federal district courts, i.e., trial courts, including those outside of Chief Judge Posner's United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 57 and
52
See the feDeralist no. 60, supra note 5, at 326 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature."); see also the feDeralist no. 52, supra note 5, at 286 (James Madison-but authorship is disputed) (explaining that House qualifications were "regulated" by the "[C]onvention" which framed the Constitution).
53
See 2 JosePh story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the uniteD states § 624 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray and Company 1833) ("It would seem but fair reasoning upon the plainest principles of interpretation, that when the constitution established certain qualifications, as necessary for office, it meant to exclude all others, as prerequisites."). Albeit, Story was rejecting the power of the States to add qualifications in regard to House and Senate membership.
54
See supra note 48 (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc.).
55
See supra note 5 (collecting the primary qualifications-related constitutional provisions for elected federal positions, including the presidency). See, e.g., Cathcart v. Meyer, 88 P.3d 1050 , 1071 (Wyo. 2004 ) (Voigt, J.) ("The general rule, and the better-reasoned rule, is that constitutionally prescribed qualifications for holding a constitutional office are exclusive."); Okla. State Election Bd. v. Coats, 610 P.2d 776, 778-79 (Okla. 1980 ) (Hodges, J.) ("The general rule is that when the constitution establishes specific eligibility requirements for a particular constitutional office, the constitutional criteria are exclusive. The legislature, except where expressly authorized to do so, has no authority to require additional or different qualifications for a constitutional office."); State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 446 P.2d 445, 448 (N.M. 1968 ) (per curiam) ("The state may provide such qualifications and restrictions as it may deem proper for offices created by the state; but for offices created by the United States Constitution, we must look to the creating authority for all qualifications and restrictions." (emphasis added)); Buckingham v. State ex rel. Killoran, 35 A.2d 903, 906 (Del. 1944 ) (Rodney, J.) ("It is the general law that where a constitution creates an office and prescribes the qualifications that the incumbent must possess, that the legislature has no power to add to these qualifications." ( 2D 155, § 3 (originally published in 1954) ("According to a substantial amount of authority, where a constitution lays down specific eligibility requirements for a particular constitutional office, the constitutional specification in that regard is exclusive and the legislature (except where expressly authorized to do so) has no power to require additional or different qualifications for such constitutional office."). Pitt. l. rev. 845, 856-857 (1995) (restating Joseph Story's position in his Commentaries as " [s] ince the Constitution created both the offices of President and Representative, the qualifications that the Constitution enumerated for each office were the exclusive qualifications one would need to possess in order to hold office"); Matthew J. Franck, No, a Statute Can't Keep Hillary From Being President, national review: BenCh memos (Mar. 18, 2015, 1:41 Pm) , http://www.nationalreview.com/benchmemos/415603/no-statute-cant-keep-hillary-being-president-matthew-j-franck ("Last night on her Fox News program, Megyn Kelly was discussing the Hillary Clinton e-mail affair with Shannen Coffin . . . and after partially quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2071, Kelly remarked that if Clinton was [sic] indeed guilty of destruction of documents, she would not only have committed a felony but 'she cannot be president.' . . . [The question] is not so interesting, because the answer is so obvious, is whether this statute has any effect whatsoever on eligibility to be president. It doesn't, because it can't." (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., masKell, supra note 5, at CRS-1 ("Although there may have been some credible minority argument concerning the ability of Congress or the states individually to set additional or different qualifications for federal office from those set out in the Constitution, it is now wellsettled Furthermore, the case for exclusivity in regard to the Constitution's express textual eligibility requirements for the presidency is stronger than the coordinate issue decided in Powell, i.e., the exclusivity of the Constitution's express textual qualifications for House seats. The power to judge members' qualifications is expressly and unambiguously committed to each house of Congress, 60 but no such express power is unambiguously committed to Congress in regard to adjudicating a contest involving a presiden-tial candidate's, president-elect's, or President's eligibility requirements.
61 It would seem to follow that if Congress has no power to add to the standing qualifications of its own members, then it cannot add to the standing eligibility requirements for the other constitutionally-mandated elected federal positions, 62 i.e., the President and Vice President. For all these reasons, it seems likely that Powell is controlling, and that applying Section 2071's "office under the United States" language to the presidency is unconstitutional. Indeed, the more likely that Powell is seen as controlling because the constitutional principles at stake are clear, the less likely it is that Congress-whose members are presumed to understand the Constitution's broad structural requirements-intended its "office" language to apply to elected positions, such as the presidency. 63 nevertheless, it is possible to make a principled distinction between the facts and law at issue in Powell from the consequences of a potential Clinton-related prosecution and conviction under Section 2071. Powell involved a legislative investigation and adjudication culminating with a resolution of a single house to exclude a member-elect. Such quasi-judicial action by an elected chamber poses due process risks, particularly because the members are both the investigators and decision-makers, because the members are political partisans, and because the members decide by sim-
61
See Muller, supra note 5, at 581 ("As a preliminary matter, the Constitution treats Congress's evaluation of executive and legislative qualifications quite differently. There is a 'textually demonstrable commitment' to Congress to evaluate the qualifications of its own members; there is no such express commitment for its handling of presidential candidates." (quoting Powell) (footnote omitted)); id. at 584-89 (explaining competing views in regard to congressional control over qualifications disputes involving presidents and presidential candidates); id. at 599-608 (explaining competing views in regard to state control over qualifications disputes involving presidents and presidential candidates [C] ongress will pass no act not within its constitutional power. This presumption should prevail unless the lack of constitutional authority to pass an act in question is clearly demonstrated."). In the Carolene Products footnote, the Court stated: "There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (Stone, J.) (emphasis added).
ple majority voting. By contrast, Section 2071 is a provision of a federal statute, part of the supreme law of the land, 64 subject to bicameral passage and presidential veto. 65 Moreover, Section 2071 contemplates the full array of traditional judicial due process rights, including: an independent Article III judge, a right to a grand jury, and a right to an impartial (unanimous) jury. 66 Given the greater respect due a statute (as opposed to a single-house resolution), and the greater procedural protections a defendant has in the context of a Section 2071 criminal prosecution (as opposed to a congressional investigation), a court might distinguish Powell and uphold the constitutionality of a federal statutory provision (such as Section 2071) even in cases where the statutory provision has the effect of adding qualifications to elected federal positions, 67 including the presidency. (1819) (Marshall, C.J.) ("A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would, probably, never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the language. . . . In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." (emphasis added)). But see Amalgamated Soc'y of Eng'rs v Adelaide S.S. Co. (1920) 28 CLR 129, 145 (Knox, C.J., Isaacs, Rich and Starke, JJ.) (Austl.) (rejecting constitutional interpretation via "implication" absent a textual anchor in the constitution). 72 Again, allowing Congress to manipulate presidential qualifications risks Congress' choosing the President, rather than the People of the United States. 73 To the extent that Section 2071 applies to the presidency, both structural concerns discussed above counsel against upholding its constitutionality. Still, such atextual structural concerns are largely intuition-driven and impressionistic. Such concerns may well have weight with some audiences, including some judges, but not with others.
74
idea that the Constitution intended to prevent congressional interference with the presidential election, which might in turn compromise the President's independence.").
However, it should also be noted that in circumstances where the electoral college fails to select a President and Vice President, it is the House which chooses the President, and the Senate which chooses the Vice President. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. Const. amend. XII; Josephson, supra note 59 passim. See 5 DeBates on the aDoPtion of the feDeral Constitution in the Convention helD at PhilaDelPhia, in 1787, at 404 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington, n.p. Supp. 1845) (James Madison, on Aug. 10, 1787, stating: "The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a republican government, and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution." (emphasis added)); see also Amar & Brownstein, supra note 71, at 31. 74 See Eugene Volokh, No, Hillary Clinton wouldn't be legally ineligible for the Presidency even if she had violated government records laws, the washington Post-voloKh ConsPiraCy (Aug. 26, 2015, 12:54 PM) , https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/08/26/nohillary-clinton-wouldnt-be-legally-ineligible-for-the-presidency-even-if-she-had-violated-government-records-laws (quoting Attorney General Mukasey's retraction, apparently based on his considering (or reconsidering) the application of Powell and coordinate structural considerations to the issue at hand). But see supra note 12 (quoting Investor's Business Daily article, a newspaper article, asserting the legal populist position); supra note 14 (collecting multiple statements by former Attorney General Mukasey asserting the legal populist position).
